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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
Plaintiff-Respondent,
)
)
v.
)
)
LUKE CARR,
)
)
Defendant-Appellant.
)
______________________________)

NO. 44924
PAYETTE COUNTY NO. CR 2016-1563

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Luke Carr pled guilty to one count of aggravated DUI, one
count of felony eluding, and one count of possession of methamphetamine. He received a
unified sentence of fifteen years, with six years fixed.
On appeal, Mr. Carr contends that this sentence represents an abuse of the district court’s
discretion, as it is excessive given any view of the facts. He further contends that the district
court abused its discretion in failing to reduce his sentence in light of the additional information
submitted in conjunction with his Idaho Criminal Rule 35 (hereinafter, Rule 35) motion.
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Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
On July 13, 2016, officers responded to a crash. (Presentence Investigation Report
(hereinafter, PSI), p.2.) Twenty-one year old Luke Carr had failed to stop for a police officer,
and was observed speeding through a residential zone and a 45-mph zone. (PSI, p.5.) At times,
he swerved into traffic, ran into the back of a semi-truck, and then caused a collision with a
minivan. (PSI, p.5.) After the collision, Mr. Carr tried to leave the scene but was apprehended.
(PSI, p.5.) The 2002 Toyota Celica Mr. Carr was driving had been reported stolen and contained
drug paraphernalia and substances testing presumptively positive for marijuana and
methamphetamine. (PSI, pp.4-5.)
Based on these facts, Mr. Carr was charged by information with aggravated DUI, felony
eluding, possession of methamphetamine, aggravated battery, felony malicious injury to
property, and grand theft by possession of stolen property. 1 (R., pp.50-53.) Pursuant to a plea
agreement, Mr. Carr pled guilty to aggravated DUI, felony eluding, and possession of
methamphetamine. (11/18/16 Tr., p.15, L.25 – p.17, L.16; R., pp.73-79.) In exchange, the State
agreed to dismiss the remaining charges and to recommend a sentence of ten years, with four
years fixed on the aggravated DUI charge; five years, with two years fixed on the felony eluding
charge—concurrent with the possession charge but both to be served consecutive to the
aggravated DUI charge—and five years with two years fixed on the possession charge.
(R., pp.73-79.) As part of the plea agreement, Mr. Carr agreed to waive his right to appeal his
sentence or to file a Rule 35 motion to reduce or amend his sentence. (11/18/16 Tr., p.8, Ls.120; R., p.77.)
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Mr. Carr was also charged with DUI, driving without privileges, and providing false
information in Payette County case number CR-2016-1560, and the cases were consolidated by
the district court before the preliminary hearing. (R., p.22.)
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At the sentencing hearing, the State asked the district court to sentence Mr. Carr to a
unified term of nine years, with six years fixed. (2/2/17 Tr., p.19, L.19 – p.20, L.10.) Mr. Carr’s
counsel asked the district court to retain jurisdiction over Mr. Carr. (2/2/17 Tr., p.23, L.22 –
p.24, L.25.)
Mr. Carr was sentenced to an aggregate term of fifteen years, with six years fixed.
(8/29/16 Tr., p.29, L.12 – p.30, L.13; R., pp.95-97.) Mr. Carr was sentenced to ten years, with
four years fixed on the aggravated DUI charge; five years, with two years fixed on the felony
eluding charge—to be served consecutive to the aggravated DUI charge; and five years with two
years fixed on the possession charge.

(R., pp.95-97.)

The district court also suspended

Mr. Carr’s driver’s license for five years from the date he is released from incarceration.
(R., p.99.)
Mr. Carr then filed a timely Rule 35 motion asking the district court to reconsider the
sentence. (Augmentation, pp.1-5.) On May 31, 2017, the district court denied Mr. Carr’s Rule
35 motion without a hearing. (Augmentation, pp.13-16.) On March 13, 2017, Mr. Carr filed a
pro se notice of appeal timely from the judgment of conviction and the district court’s order
denying his Rule 35 motion. (R., pp.123-127, 134-138.)

ISSUES
I.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed an aggregate unified sentence
of fifteen years, with six years fixed, upon Mr. Carr following his plea of guilty to one
count of aggravated DUI, one count of felony eluding, and one count of possession of
methamphetamine?

II.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Carr’s Idaho Criminal Rule
35 Motion?
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ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed A Unified Sentence Of Fifteen Years,
With Six Years Fixed, Upon Mr. Carr Following His Plea Of Guilty To Aggravated DUI, Felony
Eluding, And Possession of Methamphetamine
Mindful that he waived his right to appeal his sentence, Mr. Carr asserts that, given any
view of the facts, his aggregate unified sentence of fifteen years, with six years fixed, is
excessive. Where a defendant contends that the sentencing court imposed an excessively harsh
sentence, the appellate court will conduct an independent review of the record giving
consideration to the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and the protection of the
public interest. See State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771 (Ct. App. 1982).
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, “‘[w]here a sentence is within statutory limits, an
appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of the court imposing
the sentence.’” State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997) (quoting State v. Cotton, 100 Idaho
573, 577 (1979)). Mr. Carr does not allege that his sentence exceeds the statutory maximum.
Accordingly, in order to show an abuse of discretion, Mr. Carr must show that in light of the
governing criteria, the sentences were excessive considering any view of the facts. Id. The
governing criteria or objectives of criminal punishment are:

(1) protection of society; (2)

deterrence of the individual and the public generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4)
punishment or retribution for wrongdoing. Id.
In light of the mitigating factors present in this case, Mr. Carr’s sentence is excessive
considering any view of the facts.
Mr. Carr does have a supportive family to assist him in his rehabilitation. His mother has
been a good source of support and helps him try to stay clean. (PSI, p.26.) She wrote a letter to
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the court describing what had happened with his 19-year old brother—beaten to death by police
officers when Mr. Carr was only eight years old. (PSI, pp.125-128.) She pleaded with the court
to sentence her son so that he could receive mental health treatment—not in prison, but in the
community setting. (PSI, pp.125-128.) His sister was there for his sentencing and spoke of her
intention to support Mr. Carr in his rehabilitation. (2/2/17 Tr., p.14, L.21 – p.19, L.7.) She also
told the court the reasons why her family fears the police—their older brother was killed by the
police 13 years ago. (2/2/17 Tr., p.15, Ls.1-6.) Mr. Carr also received a supportive letter from
his brother and the mother of his child. (PSI, pp.118, 124.) When he was sentenced, Mr. Carr
had a fifteen-month-old daughter and a six-year-old nephew. (2/2/17 Tr., p.16, Ls.12-17.)
Mr. Carr was only twenty-one years old when the accident happened, but he has long
struggled with an addiction to methamphetamine. (PSI, p.31.) Although Mr. Carr did not begin
using methamphetamine until he was fifteen years old, his daily methamphetamine use from age
twenty caused him to violate his supervision and is the reason for this offense. (PSI, pp.9, 31.)
Mr. Carr was under the influence of methamphetamine at the time of the accident. (2/2/17
Tr., p.15, Ls.7-19; PSI, p.9.) However, Mr. Carr was not always an addict. His sister remembers
him as her best friend, whom she stopped seeing once he became addicted to methamphetamine.
(2/2/17 Tr., p.15, Ls.7-19.)
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that substance abuse should be considered as a
mitigating factor by the district court when that court imposes sentence. State v. Nice, 103 Idaho
89 (1982). In Nice, the Idaho Supreme Court reduced a sentence based on Nice’s lack of prior
record and the fact that “the trial court did not give proper consideration of the defendant’s
alcoholic problem, the part it played in causing defendant to commit the crime and the suggested
alternatives for treating the problem.” Id. at 91. Additionally, the Idaho Supreme Court has
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ruled that ingestion of drugs and alcohol resulting in impaired capacity to appreciate the
criminality of conduct, could be a mitigating circumstance. State v. Osborn, 102 Idaho 405, 414
(1981). Mr. Carr realizes that he is addicted to methamphetamine, and he wants treatment. (PSI,
p.31.) When his daughter was born in 2016, Mr. Carr became motivated to stay sober and
managed to do so for six months until he relapsed. (PSI, pp.25, 27.) His goals include giving
back to the community and staying sober. (PSI, p.32.)
Further, Mr. Carr has been diagnosed with PTSD because, when he was seven or eight
years old, his older brother was beaten to death by police officers. (PSI, pp.7, 25.) He has been
medicated in the past, which helped him. (PSI, p.25.) Unfortunately, Mr. Carr often selfmedicates his mental health issues with methamphetamine and marijuana. (2/2/17 Tr., p.23,
Ls.13-21.) The Idaho Supreme Court has held that the trial court must consider a defendant’s
mental illness as a factor at sentencing. Hollon v. State, 132 Idaho 573, 581 (1999).
Further, Mr. Carr expressed great remorse and accepted responsibility for his actions.
(PSI, pp.9, 32; 2/2/17 Tr., p.25, L.5 – p.26, L.6.) Mr. Carr wanted the court to know that he was
taking full responsibility for what had happened, and he even wrote a letter to the court
apologizing for what had happened. (PSI, pp.32, 104-105.) At his sentencing hearing, Mr. Carr
apologized for his actions. He told the court:
I’d just like to start out by saying that I’m sorry. I didn’t -- Mr. Fife, I really
didn’t mean to hurt anyone, you know. And I’ve had a lot of time to think about,
you know, the outcome of what my choices, like, led to. And I realize that I hurt
somebody, and I know that I wasn’t in the right state of mind. That’s no excuse.
(2/2/17 Tr., p.25, Ls.5-11.) He told the court of his intentions to be a good person and make
good decisions in the future:
But I want to be able to show you, I want to be able to show society, and I want to
be able to show everybody in my family, my daughter, that, you know, if I get
treatment and I get help and use the skills and what they teach you on a rider, like,
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I’ll be able to do good in society. I’ve made that choice already, that I want to do
good. I’m done living this life. I’m done getting in trouble.
(2/2/17 Tr., p.25, L.3 – p.26, L.6.) Idaho recognizes that some leniency is required when a
defendant expresses remorse for his conduct and accepts responsibility for his acts. Shideler,
103 Idaho at 595; State v. Alberts, 121 Idaho 204, 209 (Ct. App. 1991).
Based upon the above mitigating factors, Mr. Carr asserts that the district court abused its
discretion by imposing an excessive sentence upon him. He asserts that had the district court
properly considered his remorse, family support, and substance abuse/addiction it would have
imposed a less severe sentence.

II.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Carr’s Rule 35 Motion For A
Sentence Reduction In Light Of The New Information Offered In Support Of His Rule 35
Motion
Mindful that Mr. Carr waived his right to file a Rule 35 motion, he asserts that the
excessiveness of his sentence is even more apparent in light of the new information submitted in
conjunction with Mr. Carr’s Rule 35 motion. Mr. Carr asserts that the district court’s denial of
his motion for a sentence modification represents an abuse of discretion.
A motion to alter an otherwise lawful sentence under Rule 35 is addressed to the sound
discretion of the sentencing court, and essentially is a plea for leniency which may be granted if
the sentence originally imposed was unduly severe. State v. Trent, 125 Idaho 251, 253 (Ct. App.
1994). “The criteria for examining rulings denying the requested leniency are the same as those
applied in determining whether the original sentence was reasonable.” Id. “If the sentence was
not excessive when pronounced, the defendant must later show that it is excessive in view of
new or additional information presented with the motion for reduction. Id.
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In support of his motion for a sentence reduction, Mr. Carr submitted information
regarding his family situation. (Augmentation, p.3.) Mr. Carr has a one-year-old daughter.
(Augmentation, p.3.) Mr. Carr also wanted the district court to know that his mother is very ill
with cancer which has resulted in her having a tracheotomy. (Augmentation, p.3.) Further,
Mr. Carr has employment waiting for him; upon his release he will be employed by The
Industrial Company. (Augmentation, p.3.) Mr. Carr realizes that he has serious substance abuse
and decision-making issues, and he wants treatment for those issues in the form of a
rehabilitation problem at Cottonwood. (Augmentation, pp.2-3.) Mr. Carr asked the court to
reduce both the fixed and indeterminate portion of his sentence. (Augmentation, p.3.) In light of
Mr. Carr’s family situation and his desire for treatment, the district court should have reduced his
sentence.
Based on the foregoing, in addition to the mitigating evidence before the district court at
the time of sentencing, it is clear the district court abused its discretion in failing to reduce
Mr. Carr’s sentence in response to his Rule 35 motion.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Carr respectfully requests that this Court reduce his sentence as it deems appropriate.
Alternatively, he requests that his case be remanded to the district court for a new sentencing
hearing.
DATED this 5th day of September, 2017.

___________/s/______________
SALLY J. COOLEY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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